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Abstract: Law-enforcement agencies are increasingly able to leverage crime statistics to 
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encodes agents' entitlement to fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the rule of 
law.  Rather than precluding statistical prediction, it requires that citizens be able to 
anticipate which variables will be used as predictors, and act intentionally to avoid them. 
Furthermore, it condemns reliance on various indexes of distributive injustice, or 
unchosen properties, as evidence of law-breaking. 
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1 Background 
Legal license to treat an individual in certain ways—subjecting them to special scrutiny, 
detaining them, or ruling that they are liable to penalties—often depends on our having a 
sufficiently high degree of confidence, given the available evidence, that such treatment 
would be appropriate. When making these determinations individual police officers or 
judges sometimes rely exclusively on their own observations and evaluation of the 
available information; sometimes they consult or defer to the judgment of an expert. 
Someone attentive to how vulnerable human decision-making is to cognitive biases of all 
sorts—not to mention the distortions introduced by prejudice—might hope to improve 
these decisions by basing them on algorithmic predictions.1 Rather than relying on a 
single agent’s personal assessments of whether a particular suspect is likely to reoffend, 
for example, we might hope to leverage historical trends in re-arrest or re-conviction data 
to yield some objective measures, insulated from individual irrationality or animus.   
This, in its most optimistic frame, was the driving promise and aim of the risk 
assessment tools first developed to aid parole decisions in Chicago in 1933. The original 
model leveraged factors like marital status, behavioral infractions within the detention 
 
1 Suggestions of this kind are made in J. Kleinberg, S. Ludwig, et al., ‘Algorithms as Discrimination Detectors’ 
(2020), and Taslitz, ‘Police are People too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities for, Police Getting 
Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right’ (2010).  
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facility, prior arrest record, and work history to sort inmates into nine rough cohorts, and 
furnished parole boards with the relative frequency of re-arrest among past members of 
an offender’s cohort as an indicator of the probability that the inmate would reoffend 
(Burgess 1936-7, 499). Since then statistical ‘Risk and Needs Assessment’ (RNA) tools 
have been refined and proliferated; they are now used in the majority of jurisdictions in 
the United States to guide pre-trial decisions relating to whether (and how high) to set 
bail, as well as post-trial determinations concerning whether to divert a defendant from 
incarceration and when to consider them for parole.2  
Most of these tools employ straightforward statistical analysis on historical arrest 
databases, seeking to isolate the strongest correlations between a relatively sparse set of 
recorded variables and a property representing the target outcome (e.g. failure to appear, 
another arrest, or arrest for violent offense). There is some variation in the variables used: 
‘third generation’ risk assessment measures improve on the original ‘second generation’ 
models3 by using not only static variables—properties that do not change over time, like 
age at first arrest, having a prior conviction, sex, etc.—but also dynamic variables (e.g. 
years since last offense, employment status, present substance abuse) which are 
responsive to the subject’s current behavior, and can reflect reduced (or increased) risk 
over time. Simplifying a bit, these tools are ultimately algorithms taking the variable 
values as inputs, assigning them weights, and outputting an estimate of how often 
someone with those features in the database ends up with the target outcome. 
There is now a new wave of tools with a somewhat different structure, more aptly 
described as applications of artificial intelligence. They leverage a wide array of 
information in vast databases to train a model to recognize patterns in an existing dataset, 
in order to predict the outcome value for a new entry. This method allows the trained 
model to discover previously unnoticed correlations between the target outcomes and 
properties in the dataset. The hazard is that the correlations might be artifacts of the 
particular dataset, rather than robust connections in the underlying phenomena.4 As 
these machine-learning techniques improve, programs using them have become 
increasingly effective at a wide variety of recognition and classification tasks, and have 
been pressed into service for a range of prediction tasks, too.5  The allure of these tools is 
 
2 The most commonly used tools include the Arnold Public Safety Assessment (PSA), the Virginia Pretrial 
Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI), the Ohio Risk Assessment System (ORAS), the Correctional 
Assessment and Intervention System (CAIS), and the Level of Service/Case Management Inventory 
(LS/CMI). 
3 ‘First generation’ risk assessment refers to the unstructured clinical assessment, often based on an interview 
with the subject, that pre-dated the widespread use of the actuarial tools. 
4 There is another hazard in the context of criminal justice, which I will discuss later—that there will be robust 
connections which are themselves unjust. 
5 Many of which are discussed and criticized in O'Neil Weapons of Math Destruction (2016), Eubanks 
Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Porfile, Police, and Punish the Poor (2018), and Brayne Predict 
and Surveil: Data, Discretion, and the Future of Policing (2021). 
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that they offer a chance not just to make an informed guess about how often an outcome 
will occur in some set, but to identify and intervene in a case before the predicted outcome 
occurs or becomes acute: removing pre-cancerous tumors, connecting struggling students 
with extra resources, or, in the case of criminal justice, preventing a predicted 
victimization.  
Buoyed by enthusiasm for data-driven policing and sentencing, both sorts of 
tools have made their way into law-enforcement at several points. To name just a few 
examples: PredPol and HunchLab are used by police departments across the United 
States to identify hotspots for property crime, assault, and auto theft. Several states use 
Palantir’s data analysis program Gotham to leverage information aggregated from service 
and arrest databases in order to guide the allocation of police resources and aid in suspect 
identification and profiling. These include at least the Chicago Police Department’s 
‘Strategic Subjects Initiative’ (SSI), LAPD’s ‘Los Angeles Strategic Extraction and 
Restoration’ (LASER) program, and the Northern California Regional Intelligence 
Center. Police departments in New Orleans and New York city had similar contracts.6 On 
the post-arrest side of things, the Correctional Offender Management for Profiling 
Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) program, developed in 2002, is used both to make pre-
trial determinations about bail and post-trial determinations about sentencing and parole 
throughout Michigan, Wyoming, Wisconsin, California, and in an ever-increasing 
number of counties in other states.7 
Not everyone welcomes the increased use of algorithmic prediction tools. 
Attorney General Eric Holder, for instance, cautioned that  
“Although these measures were crafted with the best of intentions, I am concerned that 
they may inadvertently undermine our efforts to ensure individualized and equal justice. 
By basing sentencing decisions on static factors and immutable characteristics – like the 
defendant’s education level, socioeconomic background, or neighborhood—they may 
exacerbate unwarranted and unjust disparities that are already far too common in our 
criminal justice system and in our society.” (Holder 2014), emphasis added. 
Some of the obvious ethical concerns about using algorithms in criminal justice---bias in 
error rates, data looping, redundant encoding, etc.---have already been the subject of 
 
6 LAPD suspended their use of LASER after significant public protest. NOPD suspended their contract with 
Palantir in early 2018, after public backlash at the secrecy of the initial arrangement and terms. Palantir had 
confidential contracts with a number of city police departments, including NYPD, and it is unclear how many 
are ongoing. Other prominent clients in the United States include the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Health and 
Human Services, and the Center for Disease Control. 
7 See Herrschaft, Evaluating the Reliability and Validity of the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for 
Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) Tool: Implications for Community Corrections Policy (2014); Kehl, Guo and 
Kessler, ‘Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Assessing the Use of Risk Assessments in Sentencing’ 
(2017). COMPAS was developed and is managed by a private company (Northpointe), which re-named itself 
‘Equivant’ in 2017. 
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significant academic and media attention. COMPAS in particular has drawn substantial 
criticism for having racially biased error rates.8 There are also a handful of epistemic 
concerns that have been raised about the probative value of risk scores, including worries 
that these systems base predictions on spurious correlations, are lacking in explanatory 
value, and give fixed datapoints from a person’s past too much weight to be epistemically 
reliable in predicting whether they will reoffend.9 In this paper, I will set all of these aside 
in order to focus on a third type of concern visible in Holder’s remarks: whether pursuing 
criminal justice with these tools is consistent with treating the defendant as an individual. 
The reason for this narrow focus is straightforward: while they are serious, the 
problems mentioned above are mostly problems with using algorithms badly. But no 
matter how we clean, debias, or supplement, all the tools in question trade in actuarial 
inference. The score assigned to an individual does not reflect any deep insight into his 
“true nature”; it reports the frequency of a type of outcome among people in the database 
who are similar to him with respect to the values of the predictor variables.  Setting aside 
programs focused on predicting locations of crimes rather than individuals, the basis for 
risk predictions made by these algorithmic tools is, ultimately, observations about the 
behavior of other people. The reasoning structure is actuarial in that it moves from the 
conjunction of the subject has feature G and the relative frequency of feature F among 
others with G is x to confidence of approximately x in the subject has feature F. In a 
slightly different context—addressing the use of statistical or probabilistic evidence to 
establish liability in civil trials, or settle sentencing questions in criminal trials—several 
legal theorists, philosophers, and judges have objected that inferences of this form 
functionally make it a ‘crime to belong to a reference class,’10 violating the right to be 
 
8 While COMPAS is equally likely to misclassify defendants of any race in one way or another, it is 
disproportionately likely to misclassify a Black defendant as high risk, and disproportionately likely to 
misclassify a white defendant as low risk. See Angwin, Larson, Mattu, and Kirchner, ‘Machine Bias: There's 
software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it's biased against Blacks’ (2016). Angwin et 
al. focused their analysis on predictions for people arrested in Broward County, Florida, between 2013-2014. 
9 PredPol, SSI, and LASER employ a mix of arrest, crime reporting, and conviction data, raising worries that 
enforcement bias and differing levels of confidence in the police distort the dataset in ways that compromise 
the fairness of the algorithms. See Richardson, Schultz and Crawford, ‘Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil 
Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice’ (2019). See also Bolinger, 
‘Explaining Justificatory Asymmetries between Statistical and Individualized Evidence’ (2021), arguing that 
statistical evidence in general makes at most a marginal contribution to justified credences, while introducing 
a risk of error concentrated on particular demographic groups, and so over the long run, the evidential value 
of relying on it is outweighed by the moral cost of so doing. 
10 See, e.g., Colyvan, Regan and Person, ‘Is it a Crime to Belong to a Reference Class?’ (2001); Enoch, Spectre 
and Fisher, ‘Statistical evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge’ (2012); Risinger, ‘Unsafe 
verdicts: The need for reformed standards for the trial and review of factual innocence claims’ (2004); 
Thomson, ‘Liability and Individualized Evidence’ (1986), and Tribe, ‘Trial by Mathematics: Precision and 
Ritual in the Legal Process’ (1971). A quite different claim, also referred to as the ‘right to an individualized 
decision’, is concerned with the use of algorithms not as applied to groups of people in order to predict the 
fittingness of some specific treatment or verdict, but to actually decide cases on the total evidence, where the 
learning data is all pre-existing caselaw (for instance), and the inputs are the facts of a given new case. These 
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‘treated as an individual’. We might reasonably ask whether this right also forbids the use 
of any of the algorithmic tools mentioned above. If so, this would be a problem not just 
with using the tools badly, but with using them at all. But it isn’t immediately obvious 
what the right to be treated as an individual forbids, because it isn’t clear what it is a right 
to, exactly.  
Rather than trace the constitutional grounds or legal interpretation of this right, 
my project in this paper is to explore its core: what moral interests might it protect, and 
are those interests threatened by relying on the outputs of algorithmic methods in 
determinations of probable cause, guilt, or sentencing? After exploring a few different 
interpretations of the right (in §2), I ultimately propose understanding it as protecting 
agents' claims to a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the rule of law (in §3). 
What it forbids is not the use of probabilistic information or statistical methods, but 
treating wrongdoing by some as justification for imposing extra costs on others; it 
demands that we respect the separateness of persons. This has significant implications for 
the administration of criminal justice (explored in §4): it permits the use of predictive 
tools in principle, but only if the predictors are transparent, subject to agents’ deliberate 
control, and unavoidable burdens are fairly distributed or outweighed by benefits to the 
very same individuals. In §5 I explain that since this bars relying on indices of distributive 
injustice or unchosen properties to determine whom to subject to extra costs associated 
with criminal justice, it precludes the most common applications of algorithmic tools for 
bail determinations or the regulation of street crime. However, they might be justifiable 
and effective in combatting white-collar crime. 
I will where possible treat all the applications together, but the implications vary 
depending on the context in which an algorithmic prediction tool is used, so it will be 
helpful to have a sense of the variety of uses to which they are put. So, very roughly: some 
of the tools mentioned are used to guide the application of pre-arrest scrutiny, 
establishing probable cause to subject someone to additional search or surveillance, arrest, 
or detention. At the next stage, a risk assessment might be offered to support bringing 
charges, or as evidence about whether the subject will either reoffend or fail to appear if 
released on bail before trial. In theory (if not in practice) profile evidence could be offered 
at trial as evidence helping to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
guilty of the crimes with which he is charged.11 Post-conviction, it could be offered at the 
time of sentencing to indicate the probability of re-offending if given a short sentence, or 
fitness for diversion into non-carceral forms of punishment (e.g. probation, supportive 
 
applications present very different problems, and for simplicity I will set them aside. For an informative 
discussion, see Binns, ‘Human Judgement in Algorithmic Loops’ (forthcoming). 
11 For an overview of present uses of profile evidence for probable cause and at trial, see Harris, ‘Particularized 
Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio’ 
(1998).  
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housing or mental health assistance programs).  Finally, it can be used at any stage within 
the sentence duration to determine eligibility for parole. 
2  Interpreting the Right 
We can start unpacking the right to individualized treatment by reviewing how judges 
have discussed the purpose and value of the requirement. Justice Stevens highlighted the 
rule’s protective function for establishing probable cause in his dissent in Samson v. 
California: “The requirement of individualized suspicion, in all its iterations, is the shield 
the Framers selected to guard against the evils of arbitrary action, caprice, and 
harassment.”12 In an opinion rejecting the use of actuarial evidence for sentencing in 
United States v. Shonubi, Judge Newman emphasized that the ‘specific evidence’ 
requirement is only satisfied by “evidence that points specifically to [behavior] for which 
the defendant is responsible.”13 A flat-footed reading of these comments might yield an 
interpretation contrasting individualization with generalized treatment, leading us to 
interpret the right as something like: 
• A claim that high-stakes legal decisions be personalized, rather than being 
subjected to ‘one-size-fits-all justice.’ 
 But this is too simplistic. As Harcourt (Against Prediction, 2007) stresses,  relying on 
actuarial data actually allows our determinations to be highly tailored to the individual. 
For instance, rather than having broad sentencing categories, these methods enable us to 
fit the sentence to the strength of the correlation between the subject’s specific features 
and re-arrest or re-conviction. We could in principle make similarly personalized 
judgments about probable cause or reasonable suspicion using algorithmic tools, given 
the very large databases and high number of personalizing variables these methods allow 
us to take into consideration. But more personalized treatment isn’t necessarily better. As 
Lippert-Rasmussen (2011) points out, personalization may lead to our being treated 
worse than otherwise, and is in some tension with other weighty principles of justice, such 
as the generality and equal application of law, and the fair social distribution of various 
burdens. More urgently, this form of individualization does not capture the connection to 
 
12 In Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 860 (2006), the US Supreme Court (voting 6-3) affirmed the decision 
of the California Court of Appeal, that it does not violate the fourth amendment protections against 
unreasonable search to subject parolees to suspicionless search because it is a condition of parole that one 
consents to search by an officer with or without cause or search warrant. Justice Stevens authored the dissent, 
joined by Souter and Breyer. 
13 United States v. Shonubi (103 F.3d 1085 2d Cir. 1997), at 1089-1090. The defendant (Charles Shonubi) was 
convicted of having smuggled heroin into the United States on eight separate occasions. At the original 
sentencing, the court multiplied the volume of heroin he was found carrying by 8, to estimate the total 
quantity smuggled across all his trips. Shonubi appealed on the grounds that the total amount hadn't been 
proved with specific evidence, and the case was sent back for resentencing. The prosecution then used 
statistics about average drug seizures using the same method, arrested at the same airport, to estimate the 
total amount; Shonubi appealed again, and Judge Newman again returned the case for resentencing, 
explaining that “The statistical and economic analyses relate to drug trafficking generally and not to Shonubi 
specifically.” at p. 1091. 
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the individual’s responsibility stressed in Judge Newman’s comments. The problem is not 
that statistical determinations are inadequately personalized, but that they are not 
appropriately responsive: they treat the individual according to how we expect him to act 
based on our experience with others like him, rather than how he himself has acted. 
Personalization is not the point. 
Moral theorists prefer to characterize the relevant obligation as a duty to be 
responsive to the individual’s responsible agency, grounded in the values of autonomy or 
respect. For instance, Dworkin (1977) contends that detaining a person based on actuarial 
prediction, however accurate, is unjust "because that denies his claim to equal respect as 
an individual." Duff (1998, 155-6) also anchors the claim in respect, holding that  
“[t]o respect the defendant as a responsible citizen, we must treat him and judge him as 
an autonomous agent, who determines his own actions in the light of his own values or 
commitments. His membership of this actuarial group is part of the context of that self-
determination; and as observers, we might think it very likely that he will have 
determined himself as a criminal.”  
Nevertheless  
“respect for autonomy, and the ‘presumption of harmlessness’ which follows from it, 
forbids us to ascribe criminal dangerousness to anyone, unless and until by his own 
criminal conduct he constitutes himself as having such a character.”  
Walen (2011) articulates the content of the state’s duty to respect the autonomy of its 
citizens in much the same way: “A state must normally accord its autonomous and 
accountable citizens this presumption [that they are law-abiding] as a matter of basic 
respect for their autonomous moral agency.'' This is consonant with suggestions by 
Amour (1994), Duff (1998), and Moss (2018) that in general taking statistical 
generalizations as reason to conclude that an individual is probably dangerous runs afoul 
of the individual’s moral claims.14   
But does treating individuals with appropriate respect really require approaching 
them as a completely novel case, without an expectation that our knowledge of other 
cases will give us reliable guidance concerning them? One might be skeptical whether 
merely predicting that an individual is likely to offend is a failure of respect or affront to 
their autonomy.15 Some do argue that viewing someone as predictable in this way fails to 
regard them appropriately as an agent, rather than a thing determined by external 
 
14 Many have argued that something similar holds more generally: respecting others’ moral autonomy 
prohibits basing our appraisals of their character on statistical evidence. See, e.g., (Walen, A Unified Theory 
of Detention, with Application to Preventative Detention for Suspected Terrorists 2011); Buchak, ‘Belief, 
Credence, and Norms’, (2014); Moss, Probabilistic Knowledge (2018). Some also maintain that we wrong 
others specifically when we use statistics to draw inferences that diminish the subject or would lead us to act 
against their interest. See e.g. Basu, ‘The Wrongs of Racist Belief’ (2019); Schroeder, ‘When Beliefs Wrong’ 
(2018); Wasserman, ‘The Morality of Statistical Proof and the Risk of Mistaken Liability’ (1992). 
15 My thanks to Patrick Tomlin for raising this concern. 
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pressures.16 But we needn’t even embrace anything this strong to identify a moral 
problem with using actuarial predictions to warrant harmfully interfering with a person. 
Plausibly, it is morally negligent or reckless to intentionally harm someone unless we 
have not only reasonably high credence (e.g. above some threshold) that the action is 
morally appropriate, but this credence is resilient. Very roughly: our present evidence 
must be such that little if any new information consistent with it would cause our 
credence to drop below the threshold.17 The more harmful the interference, the more 
resilient the credence must be to justify it. Even if making a prediction based on statistics 
is not a failure of respect for the individual’s agential freedom, using that prediction as 
grounds for harming them is a failure of respect for their agential status, because unless 
supplemented, statistical evidence cannot be adequately resilient.  
At a bare minimum, civic respect and equality still requires that the default 
orientation of law-enforcement to any member of the political community not be one 
expressive of suspicion or disrespect. Considering a person to be probably law-abiding 
orients police to respect and protect them; considering them to be probably lawbreaking 
activates a very different script. There are reasons to doubt that in practice this difference 
in default orientation is primarily responsive to evidence, rather than stereotypes or 
group-based prejudice.18 But even if it tracked group-level rates of arrest, default 
suspicion would fail to treat citizens as they are entitled. Generalizations about ‘types of 
people’ or trends in broad demographic categories aren’t sufficient to justify suspending 
the civic respect owed to a particular person, that demands treating them as probably law-
abiding. Borrowing heavily from Duff’s language, we might articulate this as: 
• A claim to be respected as a presumptively law-abiding citizen, unless and until one 
defeats this presumption through one’s own action and behavior. 
The central role this gives to respect and autonomy seems on the right track, and to 
capture much of the intuitive moral core of the demand that treatment be individualized. 
But it doesn’t explain what is objectionable about actuarial inferences after guilt has been 
established; once the presumption has been defeated by admissible, individualized 
evidence. If the right requires nothing more than that we treat agents as law-abiding until 
we have adequate particularized evidence that they aren’t, then there is no conflict at all 
between it and the use of algorithmic risk scores in making sentencing determinations. 
 
16 See, e.g, Marušić and White ‘How Can Beliefs Wrong? -- A Strawsonian Epistemology’ (2018); Basu, What 
We Epistemically Owe to Each Other’ (2019); Duff, ‘Dangerousness and Citizenship’ (1998).  
17 For a better discussion of resilience, see Joyce, ‘How Evidence Reflects Probabilities’ (2005); Buchak (2014); 
and Moss Probabilistic Knowledge (2018). For an argument that the resilience requirement explains the 
intuitive justificatory limits of statistical generalizations, see Bolinger, ‘The Rational Impermissibility of 
Accepting (some) Racial Generalizations’ (2020), and Bolinger, ‘Explaining Justificatory Asymmetries’ (2021). 
18 Analysis of transcripts of traffic stops in Oakland, CA found that police officers speak significantly less 
respectfully to black than to white community members, even after controlling for officer race, infraction 
severity, stop location, and stop outcome. Voigt, Camp, Prabhakaran, Hamilton, Hetey, Griffiths, Jurgens, 
Jurafsky, and Eberhardt, ‘Racial Disparities in Police Langauge’ (2017)  
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While one could simply accept this conclusion, it seems to me that the ‘presumption of 
law-abidingness’ does not exhaust the obligations grounded in civic respect.  
What else might it entail? Perhaps 
• A claim to not be subject to extra burdens simply on account of one’s social 
identity. 
This is the interpretation naturally suggested by Colyvan, Regan and Person (2001), and 
rejected as unrealistically idealistic by Tillers (2005). There are two ways to develop the 
thought that equality of standing or respect entitles individuals to be free from extra 
burden, and I find both plausible. On the one hand, we might be concerned about being 
subject to disproportionate burdens associated with law-enforcement, relative to other 
groups; this is the central animating idea behind Bambauer (2015)’s explication of why 
statistical evidence should not be used to establish probable cause. On the other hand, we 
might worry about being subject to burden that they would not be subject to were we to 
hold all else except their social identity fixed; something like this the centerpiece of 
Underwood (1979)’s explanation of why racial membership and other protected 
categories are an inappropriate base for statistical prediction. She grounds protection 
against the use of these and other unalterable features in the value of autonomy: “Of all 
the factors that might be used for predictive purposes, those beyond the individual's 
control present the greatest threat to individual autonomy. Use of such factors in a 
statistical prediction device is particularly undesirable if the device is to be used in a 
context in which autonomy is highly valued."19 This emphasis on preserving the 
individual’s control gives us reason to also object to adding burdens to social identities 
that aren’t themselves protected, but are either unchosen (e.g. socio-economic status), or 
reflect important personal choices (e.g. marital status).  
Some offer a more procedural gloss of the right, arguing that it is actually a proxy for 
the right to a certain kind of explanation for the state’s decisions in her particular case:20 
• A claim to an explanation for the State’s exercise of coercive powers. 
Vredenberg (working paper) compellingly argues that the value of explanations of this 
kind is instrumental. Access to such explanations is a prerequisite for agents’ ability to act 
on the political system, to hold it accountable, and form the rules which characterize the 
basic structure of society. The right so understood requires both more and less than that 
the subject be given a true account of why a legal decision concerning her has been made; 
the explanation offered must equip her to act intentionally to hold the decision-making 
body accountable. It therefore must both be intelligible to her, and bear some relation to 
 
19 Underwood, ‘Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized 
Judgment’ (1979), at p. 1436. 
20 This interpretation is implicit in the ‘explanationist’ strand of the legal literature on statistical evidence, 
which contend that statistical evidence should be inadmissible in trials because it is inadequately explanatory, 
or supplies probabilistic support without raising the plausibility of the hypothesis that the defendant is guilty. 
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the actual decision-making procedure employed. In understanding the moral core of the 
right to individualization as a right to the information necessary to form and reform the 
legal policies, this gloss aligns closely with Justice Stevens’ comment that the right is a 
shield against arbitrary uses of state power.  
Each of these interpretations highlights something of value in the content of a 
right to be treated as an individual. Rather than offer a competing interpretation of 
‘individualization’, I suggest that in fact the right doesn’t protect a unique interest—
rather, the entitlement to ‘be treated as an individual’ simply demands that the 
procedures of the criminal law be justifiable not merely in the aggregate but to each 
individual subject to them. Rephrased, it is:  
• A claim to fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of public law.  
So interpreted, the right entails that a person must not face disproportionate burden or 
suspicion except as a consequence of their own responsible action, and that agents of the 
state default to respectful engagement. It is grounded ultimately in the preconditions for 
laws to be fair, both in their content and administration. The crowning virtue of the rule 
of public law is its ability to shape citizens’ practical reason and ground reliable 
expectations, enabling them to hold each other to standards which they had fair 
opportunity to meet. Its benefits include many of the values articulated by the 
interpretations we’ve surveyed: expressing respect for autonomy, constraining the 
exercise of coercive power, ensuring that sanctions are responsive to responsible agency, 
and ensuring that those subject to law are in a position to challenge or reform it. The 
burdens, meanwhile, are the various costs associated with the scrutiny and punitive 
sanctions applied in the course of enforcing the laws. What fair distribution of burdens 
and benefits demands depends on context: pre-conviction, every individual must have 
fair opportunity to avoid hostile encounters with law enforcement; at trial they must not 
face disproportionate likelihood of false conviction; post-conviction they must not be 
subject to disproportionate punishment.   
 To afford all individuals a fair opportunity to avoid hostile encounters with law 
enforcement the laws must be public, clear, and prospective.21 These are necessary 
conditions on its ability to structure citizens’ relationships to each other and the state in a 
way that expresses respect for their autonomy and equality as agents. Citizens can’t know 
what the law forbids if its requirements are secret or inscrutable; if it is retroactive, they 
cannot act intentionally to avoid violating it.22 Importantly, these requirements take 
 
21 I am primarily focused on a notion of ‘fair opportunity’ that is non-comparative, demanding simply a 
normatively sufficient chance of avoidance. But a comparative conception of fairness is also relevant here, 
requiring that a subject have not substantially worse chances of avoidance than others in the political 
community (I am indebted to comments from Chad Lee-Stronach for this point). 
22 My analysis in this section strongly echoes Fuller’s articulation of the value of the rule of law, particularly as 
developed and defended by Murphy, ‘Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law’ (2005). Fuller, The 
Morality of Law (1969, p. 106) gives eight requirements for the rule of law: law must be (1) general, (2) 
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lexical priority over considerations of administrative efficiency: the value of the rule of 
law is lost if the laws are applied in ways that do not facilitate the mutual accountability of 
citizens and state. Choices about the administration of public law have drastic 
implications for individuals’ freedom, ability to pursue their life projects, and 
participation in the political community. Legal transgressions expose a person to the 
coercive power of the state in various forms, ranging from asset forfeiture to deprivation 
of liberty and loss of civic rights. General appeals to the aggregate value of efficient crime 
reduction cannot justify or compensate a particular person for their loss of crucial 
protections against suffering the State’s coercive imposition of these harms.  It is good to 
lower the average risk of suffering victimization, but if an overall reduction is achieved by 
dramatically increasing the burdens borne by particular members of the population in a 
way that neither tracks their responsible action nor is offset by equally weighty benefits to 
them, the burdens and benefits of the rule of law are not fairly distributed. 
I suggest, then, that the right issues an injunction not against the use of 
probabilistic information or generalizations, but against a familiar form of moral 
aggregation. Just as invocations of the separateness of persons are in other contexts made 
to assert that benefits to some cannot offset harms to others, the demand that we treat 
people as individuals here asserts that wrongdoing by some does not weaken others’ 
moral claim against the imposition of extra costs, even if they belong to the same 
demographic group. The right to individualized treatment is the right of those subject to a 
criminal law that its procedures be justifiable to them individually, not only by appeal to 
average outcomes. This lens is both unifying and clarifying: it explains why each of the 
earlier glosses feels partly—but only partly—right. And unlike the other interpretations, 
which identify relatively all-purpose goods or moral interests, this reading of the right 
gives it a content specific to criminal law.23 
 Accepting this interpretation has relatively revisionary implications for the 
administration of criminal law. While I am mainly exploring the limitations the right 
imposes on algorithmic prediction tools, it is worth noting that it constrains non-
predictive administrative decisions, too. Consider the practice of cash bail (allowing 
individuals to avoid pre-trial detention conditional on paying a sizable fee, typically 
$10,000, refunded if they appear on their scheduled court date). The immediate effect is 
to ensure that some of the most severe burdens of an encounter with the law—lengthy 
pre-trial detention, during which the defendant incurs a variety of costs often including 
 
publicly accessible, (3) prospective rather than retrospective, (4) clear, (5) non-contradictory, (6) possible to 
satisfy, (7) stable, and (8) there must be congruence between what the law requires and what is enforced. 
23 My thanks to Tom Parr for pointing this out. Importantly, I do not mean to imply that we have a moral 
interest in being treated as an individual only in the domain of legal decisions. The relationships of respect 
and answerability that law formalizes may extend to informal, interpersonal interactions, and so plausibly the 
interest protected by a formal right to an individualized decision may persist in as a moral claim in informal 
contexts. My thanks to Deborah Hellman for discussion on this point. 
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job-loss due to forced absence—fall disproportionately on the very poor.24 The median 
yearly income for people who are detained pre-trial because they cannot post a bail bond 
is just $15,109; 37% make less than $9,489 per year.  This practice leaves those below the 
poverty line exposed to disproportionately severe burdens, without affording them 
offsetting benefits adequate to justify the imposition. Whether bail determinations are 
made in highly personalized ways or in deference to an algorithmically produced risk 
score, insofar as they distribute the burdens and benefits of the rule of law unfairly, they 
violate the moral interest that animates the right to be treated as an individual.25  
3 Individual Treatment and Algorithmic Tools 
On my analysis, the right to be treated as an individual is in principle consistent with the 
use of algorithmic tools in criminal law. But rather than make a particular policy 
proposal, I think it more fruitful to fill in the general contours of the constraint, 
articulating more specifically what it means for a policy to be justifiable to those subject to 
it. As I have unpacked it, what the right requires is not that the application of legal 
sanctions be personalized, but that they be justifiable to each individual subject to them. 
This is necessary for the administration of criminal law to express appropriate respect for 
each individual’s autonomy and preserve the mutual accountability of citizens and state. 
Applying this specifically to predictive tools, I claim that if a factor f is used as a predictor 
in the administration of criminal law, at least three conditions must be met: 
• [CONTROL] -- f must be subject to agents’ deliberate control 
• [TRANSPARENCY] -- It must be transparent that f is used as a predictor, such that 
the basis for decisions is sufficiently clear to facilitate civilian criticism or reform. 
• [BURDENS] -- The unavoidable extra burdens imposed by using f as a predictor 
(increased hassle, risk of false conviction, or severity of punishment) must be 
outweighed by the benefits it yields to the individuals who must bear these 
burdens.  
I suspect that in practice, there are few applications within the administration of criminal 
law where predictive algorithms can be deployed while satisfying all of these conditions.  
Let’s start with the Control condition. We said earlier that to avoid subjecting 
anyone to more than their fair share of burden, legal sanctions must be tied to responsible 
agency. It follows that it must at least be in-principle possible for an individual of any 
 
24 Rabuy and Kopf (Detaining the Poor: How money bail perpetuates an endless cycle of poverty and jail time, 
2016)’s analysis of data released by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that “the median bail amount 
[$10,000] represents eight months of income for the typical jailed defendant." 
25 Reforms that waive bail if a defendant receives a low risk score reduce the number of poor who are 
subjected to pre-trial detention, but concentrate its effects more heavily on residents of poor communities of 
color. Rather than using risk scores to filter its effects, fairly distributing the burdens and benefits of law 
would require that we do away with cash bail as a general practice. My thanks to Tali Mendelberg for bringing 
this case to my attention, and to Sarah Stroud for pointing out the range of implications the right to 
individualized treatment has (if I am right) for the administration of criminal law beyond questions about the 
use of algorithms. 
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permissible social identity to avoid suffering a downside cost that is not born by everyone. 
So if a high risk-score suffices to justify extra scrutiny, conviction, or a lengthier sentence, 
the predictor variables can’t be tied to unchangeable identity-tracking properties like race 
or gender. But mere in-principle avoidability is not sufficient to ensure that extra costs 
track agency. So the properties used to indicate criminality—and thus to determine the 
distribution of costly legal sanctions—must also be ones that at least the actually law-
abiding agents could act to avoid. They can’t be things that subjects have little real chance 
of escaping, like residence in high-crime neighborhoods, poor educational background, 
or an unstable family environment.26 We will likely find robust correlations between these 
features and criminal offending rates, especially in historical databases—but it would 
violate the right to individual treatment to leverage such correlations to justify the 
predictive application of criminal sanctions, because doing so concentrates extra hassle 
and risk on individuals on the basis of factors over which they lack agential control.  
The Transparency condition articulates a precondition for the rule of law. Law 
expresses respect for subjects’ autonomy only when it enables citizens to anticipate what 
compliance requires from them. So, in addition to the brute ability to avoid properties 
that would lead to having a high risk-score, subjects must also be able to act intentionally 
to avoid them—which means they need to able to know which variables are used, and 
roughly how. Finally, the Burdens condition acknowledges that some costs are 
unavoidable, and cannot always be distributed perfectly evenly across the population. It 
allows the imposition of these costs, but only if they are offset by benefits to the 
individuals who bear them.  
4 The Space for Prediction 
One might worry that my interpretation of these constraints is too strict; that the 
population-level gains to efficiency or accuracy justify violating at least one of them in 
some contexts.  For instance, can’t the deterrence-benefits of using algorithmic 
predictions to guide reasonable suspicion outweigh individual subjects’ moral complaints 
against failures of transparency, provided that the algorithms are sufficiently accurate?  
4.1 Secrecy and Strategic Gaming  
One immediate argument for this kind of tradeoff appeals to the importance of keeping 
prediction factors secret in order to avoid “strategic gaming”: subjects deliberately 
manipulating or avoiding the predictors while continuing to engage in the targeted 
 
26 This intersects with a dilemma arising from antecedent distributive injustice: children who grow up in 
concentrated urban poverty do not have prospects of avoiding criminality comparable (or even close) to those 
with different social starting positions. For a discussion of this dilemma, see especially Ewing, ‘Recent Work 
on Punishment and Criminogenic Disadvantage’ (2018); Howard, ‘Moral Subversion and Structural 
Entrapment’ (2016); Kim, ‘Entrapment, Culpability, and Legitimacy’ (2020); Shelby, ‘Justice, Deviance, and 
the Dark Ghetto’ 2007); and Watson ‘A Moral Predicament in the Criminal Law’ (2015). 
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behavior (e.g. criminal offenses). First let’s get clear on the assumptions behind this 
objection.27 Strategic gaming is problematic only under very specific conditions:  
(i) the proxy criteria (the predictors) only weakly or contingently correlate 
with the target criteria,  
(ii) the proxy properties are within subjects’ deliberate control (they are 
alterable),  
(iii) the tradeoff costs of gaming the proxy criteria are low, and  
(iv) moreover this can be done without affecting the subject’s true eligibility 
with respect to the target criteria.28   
If any one of these conditions is not met, then either a subject’s attempt to game the 
proxy will also change how they fare with respect to the target, or the difficulty involved 
in strategic gaming will offset the incentive. To illustrate: LSAT scores are an oft-used 
proxy for the facility of reasoning needed for success in law school (the target criteria). 
But they are also robustly connected to that target: students who strategically aim only to 
improve their LSATs—enrolling in test-prep courses and practicing critical reasoning 
skills—thereby also make themselves better candidates with respect to the target criteria. 
So while schools’ transparent reliance on LSATs incentivizes students to focus on 
improving their test scores, this facilitates, rather than undermines, the end goal of 
admitting well-prepared students.29 The possibility of strategic gaming fails to provide 
even a pro tanto justification for keeping proxy criteria secret unless gaming would 
undercut the aims. 
Similarly, if the proxy for criminal wrongdoing is robustly connected to 
wrongdoing—e.g. if affiliation with a violent organization like the Proud Boys, or 
performance of preparatory acts like buying a high-capacity magazine for a firearm or 
purchasing large quantities of ammonium nitrate fertilizer are the chosen proxies—
publicity can be net-beneficial. By incentivizing avoidance of the proxy, transparency 
discourages the linked criminal behavior.  It also equips those for whom the proxy was 
misleading to avoid or politically contest decisions that rely on it, thus reducing the false-
positive error rate. Especially when the costs of a false-positive are comparatively high, 
these error-correcting tendencies of transparency can be expected to outweigh the costs 
 
27 For much of the following discussion, I am indebted to immensely helpful conversations with Kathleen 
Creel. 
28 I’ve drawn these conditions for problematic strategic gaming from Cofone and Strandberg, ‘Strategic 
Games and Algorithmic Transparency’ (ms). 
29 There is a different worry about using LSAT scores as a proxy for lawschool readiness: students without 
access to testprep resources, but otherwise equally promising, will be excluded by this proxy. Since access to a 
top lawschool is one of the means of social mobility, there is a legitimate concern that using the proxy 
unjustly skews access to those with higher disposable family income. While important, this is not ultimately a 
concern about strategic gaming. My thanks to Geoff Sayre-McCord for discussion on this point.   
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of strategic gaming. But precisely because using predictive proxies attaches costs to 
behaviors that are not themselves wrongdoing, and so shapes the behavior of those 
subject to it, Underwood (1979, at p. 1438) cautions that “[r]espect for autonomy thus 
counsels not only against the use of uncontrollable factors, but also against the use of 
those controllable factors that involve behavior generally regarded as private and 
protected against official interference.” Even where predictive, the range of properties 
used as proxies to guide the application of criminal sanctions will need to be tightly 
constrained to ensure that it does not intrude too far on autonomy. 
 The need to keep a proxy secret arises when all four of (i)-(iv) above are met. 
Given the way I have characterized the right to individualized treatment, plausibly 
anything consistent with it will satisfy conditions (ii) and (iii): that the proxy be within 
subjects’ deliberate control, and low-cost to alter or avoid. So strategic gaming could be a 
genuine concern if there are compelling reasons to use a highly contingent proxy 
(satisfying [i]) that is strongly independent of criminal wrongdoing (satisfying [iv]). 
There may be many administrative decisions for which it is permissible to use secret 
proxies, but I contend that, with few exceptions, the administration of criminal law is not 
one of them. Using a property as a proxy for criminality imposes significant costs on 
those who have it—at least high risk of ‘hassle factor’ (the costs associated with being 
subjected to extra scrutiny), at worst high risk of suffering unwarranted punishment or 
assault by agents of the state. When the proxy is only weakly connected with criminal 
wrongdoing, the state can neither justify its decision to secretly use it by appeal to the 
harm principle, nor necessity, nor to the decision’s having been ratified by a democratic 
decision-making process. And when reliance on the proxy concentrates the highest costs 
of false-positives disproportionately on an already disadvantaged subpopulation, 
members of that subgroup have a dual complaint against secrecy: one against the ways 
that attaching costs to the proxy property undermines their autonomy, and one against 
the way that the choice of proxy fails to treat their subgroup as political equals. When 
there are adequate alternative means of enforcing the law, the presumptive weight of 
either of these complaints defeats the marginal administrative efficiency that could be 
achieved by a secret proxy. 
4.2  Opacity 
A thoroughly different argument against transparency holds not that it is undesirable, but 
that it is impossible: the ways a sophisticated algorithm arrives at its predictions can be too 
complex to understand, let alone explain. No matter how much we might want to be 
transparent about the reasons why these algorithms make the predictions they do, the 
best we can do is describe how the algorithm was trained. But though the thought that 
predictive algorithms are essentially a “black box” has captured the popular imagination, 
it is something of a red herring in this context. Not all predictive algorithms are 
uninterpretable; only those arising from unconstrained or unsupervised ‘deep’ learning 
using high-dimensional models present this particular challenge. When they are 
comparably accurate, more transparent algorithms are preferable since opacity can 
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obscure errors and makes it difficult to troubleshoot. And it is unlikely that either high-
dimensional models or deep learning methods will be necessary—or much help—for 
optimizing the predictive accuracy of algorithms specifically in the context of criminal 
law. Though great advances have been made in recognition and automated judgment 
tasks, machine-intelligence has yet to stably out-perform simple rules at predicting social 
outcomes (like arrests), consistently plateauing around 65-70% accuracy overall.30   
COMPAS is no exception: though it leverages a complex model, using up to 137 
features of an individual’s file to predict risk of being arrested for any new offense within 
two years of release, it only achieves about 68% overall accuracy.31 What this means is that 
roughly two-thirds of the time either the person was classified as low-risk and in fact was 
not rearrested within two years, or they were classified as medium or high risk and were 
rearrested. An independent audit of COMPAS’s predictions by Angwin, et al. (2016) 
found that the program had a slightly lower accuracy rate for those it classified as high-
risk (61%), but much lower accuracy when predicting violent reoffending specifically:  
only 20% of those classified as highly likely to be rearrested for violent crimes actually 
were.  
A predictive accuracy rate of 65-70% is roughly on par with the far simpler 
models used by the second-generation risk assessment tools developed in the 1970s. 
Dressel and Farid (2018) found that a standard linear predictor using just 7 static features 
(age, sex, number of juvenile misdemeanors, number of juvenile felonies, number of prior 
crimes, crime degree, and charge) yields results comparable to COMPAS’s predictor.32 In 
fact, they found that untrained subjects who were given just these datapoints about each 
case and asked to make a prediction (without receiving any particular instruction as to 
how) also outperformed COMPAS in overall accuracy, and displayed slightly less racial 
bias.33 Perhaps most startlingly—and underscoring just how far our prediction tools are 
from the imagined pre-crime oracles of Minority Report—all of these predictive methods 
 
30 Narayanan, How to Recognize AI Snake Oil (2019 working paper); Yang, Wong and Coid, ‘The Efficacy of 
Violence prediction: a meta-analytic comparison of nine risk assessment tools’ (2010). 
31 Northpointe invoked trade secrets to avoid disclosing the details of their model, but their in-house 
evaluation of their software put overall accuracy at 68%. See Dieterich, Mendoza and Brennan, COMPAS risk 
scales: Demonstrating Accuracy, Equity, and Predictive Parity (2016). 
32 At p.3. It’s worth noting that since offending is measured by arrest (or in some cases conviction), rather than 
directly observed, some proportion of these tools’ accuracy is just their ability to predict arrest patterns, which 
are subject to enforcement bias.   
33 Dressel and Farid (‘The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting Recidivism’, 2018) ran two studies 
with untrained subjects. In the first condition, participants were given just the seven features listed; in the 
second, they were also told the defendant’s race. COMPAS has a recorded overall accuracy of 64.9% for Black 
defendants, 65.7% for white. It has a 40.4% false-positive error rate for Black defendants, 25.4% for white; and 
false-negative error rates of 30.9% and 47.9%, respectively. By comparison, Dressel & Farid’s subjects had an 
overall accuracy of 68.2% for Black defendants, 67.6% for white (in condition II this dropped to 66.2% and 
67.6%, respectively); false-positive error rates of 37.1% (this rose to 40% in condition II) for Black defendants, 
and 27.2% (26.2% in condition II) for whites; and false-negative error rates of 29.2% (rose to 30% in condition 
II) for Black defendants and 40.3% (42.1% in condition II) for whites. 
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were out-performed by a crude predictor with just two static factors: birthdate and 
number of prior convictions. While these facts should raise serious moral concerns about 
relying on the predictions yielded by these algorithmic tools when making high-stakes 
decisions, they provide one point of reassurance: uninterpretable models pose no special 
hurdle to transparency for our purposes, because they aren’t all that useful for the 
applications of interest to us. 
4.3 Moral Hazards of Training Predictive Models  
There is a deeper reason to generally avoid using deep machine learning to develop 
prediction tools for criminal law. These methods require substantial training data in 
order to learn predictive patterns, but it is treacherous to use the extant databases 
(requests for service, crime reports, arrests, or convictions) for this purpose. Information 
recorded in these datasets is invisibly shaped both by administrative discretion and by 
upstream structural injustices that artificially forced overlap between communities of 
color and criminogenic conditions--most especially underfunded schools and depressed 
economic conditions.  
Some hope that we can correct for this with more or bigger datasets: given rich 
enough data, factors that are unrelated to the outcome of interest won’t correlate closely 
enough with it to be reliable predictors, and so will not be learned. 34 But this optimism is 
misplaced when the information in available datasets is relatively sparse, or the overlap 
between properties is not accidental but artificial, or the outcome can only be measured 
or represented indirectly through measures (like ‘arrests’) that are themselves shaped by 
unrelated factors (like the probability of detection, political influence, trust in the police, 
or familiarity with legal protections). As Johnson (2020) demonstrates, even explicitly 
coding a model not to use properties like race or gender as predictors will not prevent it 
from learning to make predictions that track these features: "Where there are robust 
correlations between socially sensitive attributes, proxy attributes, and target features, and 
we’ve ruled out using the socially sensitive attributes, the next best thing for the program 
to use will be the proxy attributes." Put simply, algorithms trained on datasets in which 
decisions to arrest, conviction, sentence, and re-arrest have been subject to racial bias can 
be expected to learn correlations that, though causally spurious, are genuinely “there” in 
the data, projecting these traces of past injustice forward.35   
For street crime in particular (including robbery, vehicle theft, arson, homicide, 
and assault) many of the strongly correlated properties are straightforward measures of 
socioeconomic disadvantage:  employment status, income, education level, prior contacts 
with police, and relative security of housing. So it is doubtful that an algorithm trained on 
the available datasets would be able to respect the constraint that predictors be limited to 
 
34 My thanks to Simon Goldstein and Stephen Finlay for this suggestion; it is developed in more detail in J. 
Kleinberg, J. Ludwig, et al. (2018), at p. 136. 
35 For more thorough articulation and three detailed case studies of dirty data being used to train the models 
for predictive policing software, see Richardson, Schultz and Crawford (2019). 
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factors within subjects’ deliberate control. But even bracketing these concerns about 
available training data, and even if the predictions made were highly accurate, the right to 
individualization as I have interpreted it may more directly preclude using deep machine-
learning in developing the algorithms. A learning method which bases the risk prediction 
on correlations that emerge between very large numbers of variables and the outcomes is 
necessarily backward-looking and opaque. Insofar as it finds unexpected or surprising 
relationships, and bases new verdicts on these, it tends toward retroactivity, imbuing 
properties that had been considered harmless with criminal significance after the fact. If 
we cannot anticipate which properties will yield a high risk-score, then we cannot satisfy 
the requirement to be prospective. So the right as I have glossed it precludes the use of 
unsupervised deep machine learning, not only because it is unexplainable, but because it 
cannot articulate expectations adequately transparent and avoidable to perform the 
functions crucial to public law.  
5 Some upshots  
We began with a simple question—is the use of algorithmic prediction tools in criminal 
law consistent with the right to be treated as individual?—and have arrived at a highly 
qualified ‘maybe’. On the interpretation I have offered, this right does not preclude the 
use of statistical methods in principle, but does significantly constrain their design and 
application. Law enforcement is fundamentally different in its orientation than some 
other applications of predictive algorithms: the law does not—must not—aim to detect 
‘social cancers’ before they manifest. It rather must function to announce expectations for 
behavior, using the coercive apparatus only to hold agents accountable to those very 
expectations. When legal decisions are made in ways that do not afford subjects a fair 
opportunity to avoid hostile encounters with law enforcement, or that impose costs 
disproportionately, this constitutes an unfair distribution of the burdens and benefits of 
the rule of law. The impulse toward secrecy must be resisted; where predictions are made, 
they must be based only on factors that are within agents’ deliberate control, and not core 
to valuable exercise of autonomy.  
 Requiring a fair distribution strongly constrains which variables can be used as a 
basis for applying extra scrutiny or criminal sanction. It rules out reliance on a great 
many static factors (age, gender, race), as well as a number of indexes of disadvantage (zip 
code or neighborhood, income level, previous police contact, number of acquaintances 
with police contacts or arrest records, education level). The former because they are 
unavoidable; the latter because using them to justify the imposition of yet more costs on 
the victims of upstream distributive injustice—this time in the form of increased risk of 
suffering unjustified state coercion—is patently unfair. But while it is clearly unjust to 
base the distribution of burdens on unavoidable factors, you might think the same cannot 
be said of distributing benefits. Suppose that rather than use high risk scores to apply 
sanctions, we were to simply use low risk scores to exonerate, shorten sentences, or waive 
bail? There is cause for concern here too. A policy of this kind channels goods towards 
those who lack the markers of disadvantage that yield a high risk score, and so can still be 
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expected to entrench racial and economic inequalities and compound disadvantage. It 
may be an improvement even so, but there is a dark side to reforms which succeed in 
alleviating injustice for many and concentrate the remaining costs on people who are 
comparatively vulnerable or politically powerless. Once only marginalized groups face the 
worst costs, it is much more difficult to muster the political will to enact the reforms 
necessary to correct the remaining injustice. A partial fix may well be worse than doing 
nothing, then, because it allows the majority to simply look away. 
Where this leaves us depends on the application. For street crime—particularly 
property offenses like autotheft, burglary, or mugging—the social value of predicting any 
particular future offense is low, especially as compared to the cost of a false positive 
prediction to each individual who is misclassified. This is because any given offense in 
this category is either quite difficult to predict with accuracy greater than chance (e.g. 
homicides), or imposes only relatively minor compensable harm (property damage or 
loss) on a small number of victims. Insofar as these sorts of crimes are also driven by 
inelastic social causes, a predictive proxy is unlikely to have strong deterrent effects, and is 
likely to track socioeconomic disadvantage. Even if it is possible in principle to design 
risk-assessment or crime-prediction algorithms independent of these variables, it is at 
best unclear what evidential or predictive value a truly unbiased tool would have. Of the 
extant tools, those that conditionalize on static variables alone presently outperform those 
that also incorporate dynamic variables. 36  We can expect that both would outperform 
prediction based only on the subset of dynamic variables that are not ruled out by the 
considerations just raised. So, while it may be possible to constrain the data used so that 
an algorithmic risk projection is consistent with the moral interests protected by the right 
to individualized treatment, it is unclear whether such predictors will have evidential 
value sufficient to justify their use. 
However, white-collar crime, wage theft, and financial fraud more generally may 
well be appropriate arenas for the use of predictive tools. These tend to have a higher 
victims-per-offense ratio, and consequently there is higher social value to predicting or 
identifying any single instance. They are also most commonly perpetrated by a relatively 
well-resourced portion of the population, for whom additional scrutiny presents little 
more than a hassle. The subpopulations subjected to extra scrutiny, higher risk of false 
conviction, or longer sentences due to reliance on algorithms in financial crimes are also 
less likely to overlap with either a stable subgroup (like racial or SES category) or with 
populations already subject to intersectional disadvantage and distributive injustice, so 
the presumptive reasons against using a secret proxy are far less weighty for this 
application. So of the possible applications for algorithmic predictions in criminal law, 
white collar crime enforcement looks most promising. 
 
36 Herrschaft (2014); Dressel and Farid (2018). But see Degiorgio and DiDonato (2013) for findings that 
adding dynamic factors to static demographic models in fact improves the fit of a model predicting probation 
revocation specifically for substance abuse. 
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In closing, let me revisit the optimistic aim of using algorithmic tools to improve 
the high-stakes decisions of criminal law. It is laudable to try to make determinations less 
biased, and to reduce the number of people subjected to unjustified or disproportionate 
costs in the course of law enforcement. Maybe we could make some progress toward this 
aim by supplementing the judgment of police officers, judges, juries, and parole boards 
with algorithmic assessments across the board. But this says more about how badly 
distorted our unassisted decisions are than about the accuracy or fairness of the 
algorithmic tools. Whether it is wise to embrace these tools as an incremental 
improvement depends on several factors we haven’t had space to work through in this 
paper, including what the alternative is, and how decisionmakers would be instructed to 
incorporate the risk predictions into their deliberations. Without going into detail now, 
it’s worth emphasizing that the most natural instruction to give—that a high risk score 
may be sufficient for an adverse judgment, but isn’t necessary—will yield the worst of 
both worlds. If adverse judgments are still permitted in the absence of a high risk score, 
then the algorithmic tool does not constrain any extant bias the decisionmakers may have 
toward (e.g.) giving disproportionately long sentences to defendants of color. But if a high 
score is sufficient, then any bias in the false-positive error rates of the algorithm simply 
combines with the extant distortions---and worse, the whole decision process has a 
veneer of being even-handed and objective. 
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